

Compartmentation

John F. Blake
Deputy Director for
Administration
7D 24 Hqs

Registry
Security

23 August 1978

Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence
7D 6011 Hqs

To 3:

Stan:

Director of Central
Intelligence
7D 5607 Hqs

Recent events tend to have overtaken parts of the attached memorandum on "Compartmentation." The conversation you and I had on this issue on Wednesday, 23 August, is one of those events. I do believe, however, it is worth your time to read this document.


/s/ Jack Blake

John F. Blake

Att:
DDA 78-3216/1

Distribution:
Orig RS - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
~~1~~ - DDA Subj
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DDA:JFB1ake:kmg (23 Aug 78)

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23 AUG 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: John F. Blake
Deputy Director for Administration

SUBJECT: Compartmentation

1. (AIUO) Action Requested: None; for your information only. I have reviewed your memorandum on this subject and will attempt to provide you with a perspective on where we now appear to stand in the compartmentation arena.

2. (C) Background: [REDACTED] commented, in effect, ^{25X1A} that there were too many cooks stirring the compartmentation pot and that we suffered from a lack of central management and common standards. He focused on the fact that collectors, with their own vested interests, were establishing compartments and writing their own implementation rules. In the past year we have seen two steps that, hopefully, will take us a long way toward regularizing that situation. In June 1978 DCID 1/19 established uniform procedures for the handling of Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI). Secondly, a proposed DCID on compartmentation is currently being floated with the NFIB members. When passed it will, in keeping with your desires, establish the DCI Security Committee as the "honest broker" who can recommend to you when compartments should be created, continued or closed out.

3. (U) Executive Order 12065 decrees that all special access programs which involve sources and methods must be approved in writing by you. Benchmarks which must be satisfied to qualify for compartmentation status include: a) the normal management and safeguarding procedures are not sufficient to limit need-to-know or access, b) the number of persons who will need access will be reasonably small and commensurate with the objective of providing extra protection for the information involved, and c) the special access controls balance the need to

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protect the information against the full spectrum of needs to use the information. All such programs must be reviewed regularly and will automatically terminate in five years unless fully rejustified. Additionally, all extant special access programs must be revalidated prior to 1 June 1979.

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4. (C) The DCI Security Committee has an initiative underway with its current review of the NRP Compartmentation Review. This review, just getting off the ground, will, of course, review the General Tighe concern over use of [REDACTED] project names in the TK world, but will use this exercise as its first attempt to revalidate [REDACTED] projects and the system itself as special access programs, using as a baseline the standards imposed by the Executive Order.

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5. (C) Additionally, the DCI Security Committee has received recent confirmation from Collection Tasking that they are ready to start the dialogue on determining what space project can be decompartmented. As we develop what SIGINT and COMIREX feel can be taken out from special system protection we would propose to confer with intelligence consumers to test the adequacy and completeness of the committees' judgments. We believe the resultant product of this joint effort will help to satisfy the balance required of customer needs versus collection sensitivities, fulfill the charge of Presidential Directive-37 to selectively relax space product controls and, as a bonus, lay firm foundations for the later revalidation program of the COMINT and TALENT-KEYHOLE special access programs.

6. (U) You also noted that you hoped that rules would be established to ensure that you are kept posted of bigot lists. We are preparing a memorandum on the subject of bigot lists for you as a result of our review of the DDO "Blue Border" documents. In it you will find that we argue for compartmentation only for sensitive activities which involve a relatively greater volume of activity and personnel. The point expressed is that, if any activity is quite small and highly sensitive, it can be provided better protection through a bigot list than by formally compartmenting it. In those cases we believe security is better served if the activity manager, whether it be the DDO, CI Staff, or a Department of Defense entity, deals directly with you on the management of the bigot list approach with no centralized system

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management or list of cleared personnel being maintained by the DCI Security Committee or Office of Security/Compartmented Information Branch. An instruction will be prepared indicating your interest in personally monitoring "bigot list" activity.

/s/ John F. Blake

John P. Blake

Distribution:

Original - DCI
1 - DDCI
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2 - DDA
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ORIGINATOR:

[REDACTED]

Robert W. Gambino
Director of Security

21 AUG 1978
Date

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Security Registry
78-2268

DDI Registry
78-3216

11 AUG 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Compartmentation

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1. Further to the conversation you, [REDACTED] and I had on security and compartmentation, I have just reviewed a memo of last September from [REDACTED] just before he left the Security Committee ("Community Security Needs and Problems," 29 September 1977, SECOM-D-282). In it he had the following paragraph:

"The Intelligence Community's special security control systems are conspicuous for their lack of central management and common standards. The perception of abuse in this area (whether or not well founded) has prompted pleas for change from many Community agencies. But, we are just now beginning to take tentative steps towards some sort of standardized procedures. A basic problem is that there are too many Community components involved in the subject. Another fundamental problem, and the one that may well cause the most suspicion on the part of consumers, is that the collectors who argue the need for compartments to begin with are also the ones who write the implementation rules, with their programs and procedures subject effectually only to review by themselves. Current approaches to the subject favor those with a vested interest in the status quo. Arguments are often made for the continuation of a system not so much because it is currently justified, but because of history. The COMINT compartment, for example, is very much in need of thorough review and revision to bring it into line with 1977 circumstances. Its parameters

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[REDACTED] The new Executive Order on security classification provides, for the first time, national level standards for compartments, and requires that all existing ones be measured against those standards and continued only where they are satisfied. Under those standards,

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
the DCI must personally approve all compartments in writing. I believe he must be able to look to a single Community focal point to coordinate the varying inputs he will need to judge the appropriateness of a compartment. Collectors obviously need to be able to argue their case for protection. Consumers need to be able to argue their case on utility of data. Someone needs to assess proposed systems and advise whether the desired security objectives can reasonably be satisfied in the real world. Then, there needs to be a Community focal point to manage the approved compartments by keeping track of authorized accesses and fielding complaints and suggestions about programs."

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2. If I understand it, the Security Committee is now working on implementing directives for the new security order which will move in the directions [REDACTED] was talking about here. Essentially, I hope that I will confirm or cancel existing compartmentation, possibly setting up new compartments and establishing rules to ensure that I'm kept posted of bigot lists, etc., that are created outside the compartmentation area. Is that correct, and are we going to take care of these points that [REDACTED] raised?

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[REDACTED]
STANSFIELD TURNER



cc: Deputy Director for
Resource Management

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Security Committee

[Handwritten signature]
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SECOM-D-282
29 September 1977

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Deputy to the DCI for the
Intelligence Community

FROM : [REDACTED]
Chairman

ST.
11 AUG 1978

SUBJECT : Community Security Needs and Problems (U)

1. (FOUO) As I leave the chairmanship of the DCI Security Committee, I would like to share some of my thoughts and conclusions on Intelligence Community security needs and problems. The needs as I see them focus on organization, management, and resources dedicated to Community security matters.

2. (U) Some particularly significant problems that I see needing effective resolution are:

a. (FOUO) Personnel Security Standards. By any reasonable test, persons throughout the government (and industry) should meet essentially the same standards for access to intelligence information at the same level of classification. The standards, however, vary widely. CIA has very stringent ones for its employees. Yet, CIA-generated intelligence is disseminated widely to Defense, State, and other agencies using lesser standards. Defense, for example, grants a Secret clearance on the basis of a non-derogatory National Agency Check, and a Top Secret clearance on the same basis if the service member has ten or more years satisfactory service. Defense permits industry to grant a Confidential clearance without any checks at all. I view these as essentially meaningless--they do not affirm claimed identity, and they do not show any positive indicators of loyalty and trustworthiness. These varying standards are based on different concepts of what is a necessary and proper basis for granting clearances. A Security Committee working group is conducting a study to try to determine what is necessary and desirable in personnel security. The results, while primarily applicable to a possible revision of DCID 1/14, should give us a good basis for proposing better standards throughout the government for access to Secret and Top Secret information. But, that is easier said than

SUBJECT: Community Security Needs and Problems

done. A fairly well-solidified body of opinion more concerned with privacy considerations and due process than with good security coalesced in recent years behind the proposed revision of E.O. 10450, which sets personnel security standards for Government employees generally. I do not believe the Intelligence Community will be able to make its views prevail in this arena unless it can speak with a single voice on the subject and be supported at the policy level.

b. (C) Computer Security. I am quite concerned about the security of intelligence information, particularly that which is compartmented, in shared ADP systems accessible by persons with varying levels of security clearances. The multi-level mode of operation of such systems relies too much in my judgment on everything working exactly as it should. Computer software cannot give positive assurances that boundaries between different classification and control levels of stored/processed data cannot be violated. The

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Business experience with fraud and embezzlement through ADP systems suggests that the perpetrators are caught more by accident than by effective security precautions built into the equipment and its software. I believe there needs to be a greater concentration of Community effort in this area, and a single Community focal point to identify specific problems and devise coordinated policy to correct them.

c. (C) Compartmentation. The Intelligence Community's special security control systems are conspicuous for their lack of central management and common standards. The perception of abuse in this area (whether or not well founded) has prompted pleas for change from many Community agencies. But, we are just now beginning to take tentative steps towards some sort of standardized procedures. A basic problem is that there are too many Community components involved in the subject. Another fundamental problem, and the one that may well cause the most suspicion on the part of consumers, is that the collectors who argue the need for compartments to begin with are also the ones who write the implementation rules, with their programs and procedures subject effectually only to review by themselves. Current approaches to the subject favor those with a vested interest in the status quo. Arguments are often made for the continuation of a system not so much because it is currently justified, but because of history. The COMINT compartment, for example, is very much in need of thorough review and revision to bring it into line with 1977 circumstances. Its parameters are set by the 1946 agreement [REDACTED].

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SUBJECT: Community Security Needs and Problems

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
The new Executive Order on security classification provides, for the first time, national level standards for compartments, and requires that all existing ones be measured against those standards and continued only where they are satisfied. Under those standards, the DCI must personally approve all compartments in writing. I believe he must be able to look to a single Community focal point to coordinate the varying inputs he will need to judge the appropriateness of a compartment. Collectors obviously need to be able to argue their case for protection. Consumers need to be able to argue their case on utility of data. Someone needs to assess proposed systems and advise whether the desired security objectives can reasonably be satisfied in the real world. Then, there needs to be a Community focal point to manage the approved compartments by keeping track of authorized accesses and fielding complaints and suggestions about programs.

3. (FOUO) I believe the Security Committee as a staff support element for the DCI is the logical focal point for the Community in all security matters. Its responsibility for such should be made explicit through charter revision, which should simultaneously see that the charters of collection committees are changed to state that their security responsibilities are advisory to the Security Committee. These changes would have to be accompanied by resource reallocations to give the Security Committee enough manpower to enable it to support the DCI's security responsibilities effectively. Current manpower authorizations essentially limit us to a collegial role, relying on Community agencies to provide personnel on an additional duty basis to chair functional subcommittees and working groups, and sometimes restricting us to the painfully slow evolution of a Community consensus before a policy can be developed or revised. With adequate manpower, we can serve as a meaningful support component for the DCI and the Community. This would involve a capability: (1) to chair with our own people the requisite subcommittees (compartmentation, computer security, etc.) and working groups (e.g., personnel security standards) and thereby control timetables and agenda; (2) to monitor compliance with DCI security directives throughout the Community; and (3) to assist Community agencies in the implementation of security policy. I believe that failure to establish and properly staff a Community focal point for security could result in outside entities seeking to fill the vacuum. Community acceptance of an cooperation with any coordinating security body will be strongly influenced by the perception of independence of such body from any single Community agency.

SUBJECT: Community Security Needs and Problems

4. (U) The above comments notwithstanding, the Security Committee has made some significant accomplishments. However, much remains to be done.

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SUBJECT: Community Security Needs and Problems

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DCI/IC/SECOM: [REDACTED]:hks:65580:30Sept77

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"Please prepare brief response to point raised by DCI in Para 2. Be careful how you handle the 'bigot list' issue. /s/Jack Blake"

Att: DDA 78-3216

Remarks:

Please prepare brief response to point raised by DCI in Para 2. Be careful how you handle the "bigot list" issue

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER 31 AUG 1978

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.

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Deputy Director for Administration

7D 24 Hqs x5454

15 Aug 78

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<p>Please prepare brief response to point raised by DCI in Para 2. Be careful how you handle the "bigot list" issue</p>					
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Suspense 8/18/78

"Please prepare brief response to point raised by DCI in Para 2. Be careful how you handle the 'bigot list' issue. /s/Jack Blake"

DDA:JFBBlake:kmg (15 Aug 78)

Distribution:

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Att: Memo dtd 11 Aug 78 to DDA fr DCI, subj:

Compartmentation (DDA 78-3216)

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